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Bargaining Dynamics and Varied Linking Costs in Stable Networks
https://agi.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000085
https://agi.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/2000085036a9ea1-bda8-4e19-b934-8442e725939f
名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
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WP2024-04.pdf (1.5 MB)
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Item type | ワーキングペーパー/Working Paper(1) | |||||||||||
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公開日 | 2024-04-15 | |||||||||||
タイトル | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
タイトル | Bargaining Dynamics and Varied Linking Costs in Stable Networks | |||||||||||
言語 | ||||||||||||
言語 | eng | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Bargaining | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Heterogeneity | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Networks | |||||||||||
キーワード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | Pairwise stability | |||||||||||
資源タイプ | ||||||||||||
資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 | |||||||||||
資源タイプ | working paper | |||||||||||
著者 |
Darpo, Erik
× Darpo, Erik× ドミンゲス, アルバロ
WEKO
327
× Martin-Rodriguez, Maria |
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抄録 | ||||||||||||
内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||||
内容記述 | n a scenario featuring two distinct player types, we examine the pairwise sta- bility of stationary networks where agents engage in infinite-horizon bargain- ing games akin to Manea’s framework. Link formation and maintenance costs are contingent upon communication ease and complementarities, with con- nections between individuals of different types becoming less expensive when complementarities are sufficiently strong. In such instances, various bipartite components emerge as stable, characterized by a lack of direct connections between players of the same type. These components exhibit inequitable dis- ributions of surplus, resulting in asymmetric splits among linked individuals. This contrasts with scenarios where connections between individuals of the same type are less costly, leading to predominantly equitable stable compo- nents. OUr findings highlight how complementarities and the relative scarcity of certain types can influence the fairness of bargaining outcomes within net- works. |
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言語 | en | |||||||||||
書誌情報 |
巻 2024-04, p. 1-35 |
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著者版フラグ | ||||||||||||
出版タイプ | NA | |||||||||||
出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_be7fb7dd8ff6fe43 | |||||||||||
JEL分類コード | ||||||||||||
言語 | en | |||||||||||
主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||||
主題 | JEL classification: C72, C78, D85 |