@techreport{oai:agi.repo.nii.ac.jp:02000085,
 author = {Darpo, Erik and Domínguez, Alvaro and Dominguez, Alvaro and ドミンゲス, アルバロ and Martin-Rodriguez, Maria and Martín-Rodríguez, María},
 month = {2024-04-15},
 note = {n a scenario featuring two distinct player types, we examine the pairwise sta-
bility of stationary networks where agents engage in infinite-horizon bargain-
ing games akin to Manea’s framework. Link formation and maintenance costs
are contingent upon communication ease and complementarities, with con-
nections between individuals of different types becoming less expensive when
complementarities are sufficiently strong. In such instances, various bipartite
components emerge as stable, characterized by a lack of direct connections
between players of the same type. These components exhibit inequitable dis-
ributions of surplus, resulting in asymmetric splits among linked individuals.
This contrasts with scenarios where connections between individuals of the
same type are less costly, leading to predominantly equitable stable compo-
nents. OUr findings highlight how complementarities and the relative scarcity
of certain types can influence the fairness of bargaining outcomes within net-
works.},
 title = {Bargaining Dynamics and Varied Linking Costs in Stable Networks},
 year = {}
}