@techreport{oai:agi.repo.nii.ac.jp:02000096,
 author = {髙木, 信二 and Takagi, Shinji},
 month = {Nov},
 note = {The paper explores Japanese monetary policy under the classical gold standard (1897–1914),
while providing a succinct exposition of the distinguishing features of the Japanese gold
standard regime. The paper, explaining how the Bank of Japan conducted monetary policy,
finds that, as a general practice, (i) it used fiduciary issues to offset movements in monetary
gold so as to stabilize the supply of currency; (ii) it moved the discount rate in the same
direction as the government moved the extra issue tax rate; and (iii) it raised the discount rate
in response to an increase in gold outflows. The rules-of-the-game-like behavior of discount
rate policy, motivated by the central bank’s mandate to preserve gold convertibility, was
robust and consistent, challenging the semi-consensual view that violations of the rules were
frequent and pervasive under the classical gold standard.},
 title = {An Exception that Proves the Rule: Japanese Monetary Policy under the Classical Gold Standard, 1897–1914},
 year = {2024},
 yomi = {タカギ, シンジ}
}